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INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 2001, China’s first Trust Law went into effect.1 Drafters 
and commentators hail trusts as “ideal mechanisms”2 for future 
management and transmission of wealth in China.3 They claim trusts can 
promote both donative freedom4 and family responsibility5 by giving 
Chinese citizens maximum flexibility to provide for loved ones.6 Trusts, 
 
 
 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa [Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 
74 (Apr. 28, 2001), in Guowuyuan Gongbao, no. 20, 16 (2001) [hereinafter Trust Law] (stating that 
the Trust Law enters into effect on Oct. 1, 2001). For an English-language translation of the Trust 
Law, see PRC, Trust Law, CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2001, at 22. It should be noted that the Chinese 
legal system did contain limited provisions on trusts prior to the new legislation. See Walter Hutchens, 
The PRC’s First Trust Law: Trusts Without Chinese Characteristics?, CHINA L. & PRAC., June 2001, 
at 18, 18 (discussing provisions on entrustment contracts in the 1999 Contract Law and regulations on 
financial trust companies). “[N]o prior statute spelled out the basic parameters of trust relationships, 
and courts often struggled to determine the right standards to apply.” Id. 
 2. Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa Caoan Yantao Hui Zongjie [Summary 
Report of the Symposium on the Draft Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China] [hereinafter 
Summary Report], in ZHONGGUO XINTUO FA—QI CAO ZILIAO HUIBIAN [THE CHINESE TRUST LAW—
MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS] 169, 169 (Zhu Shaoping & Ge Yi eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS]. 
 3. Interestingly, the use of trusts for private management and disposition of wealth was not one 
of the drafters’ original goals for the law; it became “important” only later in the drafting process. 
Immanuel Gebhardt & Holger Hanisch, Zhongguo Xintuo Fa Zonglan [An Overview of the Chinese 
Trust Law], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 2, at 1, 5. From the start, the 
principal goal of the Trust Law has been to provide a legal framework for China’s commercial trust 
industry. See Financial and Economic Committee of the National People’s Congress, Xinxi Beijing Ji 
Zhuyao Taolun Wenti [Background Information and Main Issues for Discussion] [hereinafter 
Background Information], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 2, at 179 (discussing 
the legislative history of the Trust Law); China’s Trust Law to Take Effect 1 October, XINHUA, Sept. 
29, 2001, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCMIR File (emphasizing the role of the new Trust 
Law in promoting “legal support” and development of China’s trust industry). Chinese drafters and 
commentators recognize that trusts may be used in a variety of other contexts as well. See ZHOU 
XIAOMING, XINTUO ZHIDU DE BIJIAO FA YANJIU [COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH OF TRUST 
SYSTEMS] 47-61 (1996) (discussing civil law, commercial, employee-benefit, charitable, and political 
trusts); Zhang Xiaocai, Bu Liaojie Xin Xintuo Ni Hui Sunshi Hen Duo [If You Do Not Understand the 
New Trusts, You Stand to Lose a Lot], RENMIN RIBAO, May 27, 2001, available at 
http://www.peopledaily.com.cn (discussing a variety of trusts that may be used by enterprises, 
individuals, and government departments). 
 4. Zhou Xiaoming, Queli Xintuo Zhidu De Xianshi Yiyi [The Practical Significance of 
Establishing a Trust System], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 2, at 21, 22 
(stating that trusts are an “ideal method” for a property owner to ensure property is distributed after his 
death in accordance with his wishes). 
 5. Summary Report, supra note 2, at 169 (stating that trusts can “promote family 
responsibility”). 
 6. Indeed, Chinese commentators cite “flexibility” of trusts as the key reason for the spread of 
trusts from common law to civil law countries. WANG QING & GUO CE, ZHONGHUA RENMIN 
GONGHEGUO XINTUO FA TIAOWEN QUANSHI [ANNOTATED ARTICLES OF THE TRUST LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 1 (2001) (“Because the flexibility of the trust for management of 
property is without parallel in other legal systems, Japan, Korea, and other countries with the 
continental [civil] law system have also introduced it and enacted trust laws.”); Li Qunxing, Xintuo De 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/6
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they say, can ensure effective management of property for the young, 
incompetent, or inexperienced.7 Trusts can protect family wealth from 
incursions by profligate heirs.8 Trusts can enable a dying father to plan for 
his young children’s changing financial and health needs after his death.9 
Trusts can provide a steady stream of income to multiple generations of 
family members.10 Trusts can even encourage China’s newly wealthy to 
donate their fortunes to charity.11 
A recent Chinese commentator on the Trust Law summed up the 
potential value of trusts with the so-called “American saying” that the 
services trusts provide are “beyond the limits of the imagination.”12 As this 
Article will argue, China must anticipate that those services are not always 
laudable.  
 
 
Falu Xingzhi Yu Jiben Linian [The Legal Nature and the Basic Concept of the Trust], 22 FAXUE 
YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 3, 118, 118 (2000) (stating that “flexibility . . . has made the trust 
system a worldwide trend”). Drafters of the Trust Law drew heavily on this foreign precedent. See 
ZHOU, supra note 3 (published version of a drafter’s doctoral dissertation providing a detailed analysis 
of trust law in common law and civil law countries). See also WANG & GUO, supra, at 1 (stating that 
the Trust Law is a legal transplant from abroad). This use of foreign models is by no means unique to 
the trust context. Since the early twentieth century, China has based much of its codification and legal 
reform efforts on foreign models (especially civil law models). See generally William C. Jones, Some 
Questions Regarding the Significance of the General Provisions of Civil Law of the People’s Republic 
of China, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 309 (1987); William Jones, Sources of Chinese Obligation Law, 52 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (Summer 1989). 
 7. See, e.g., SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, XINTUO FA [TRUST LAW] 1-2 (1999) (discussing the 
use of trusts to provide for children who are minors and incapable of managing property); Zhou, supra 
note 4, at 22, 23 (emphasizing the advantages of trusts for management of property on behalf of those 
who lack “sufficient mental or other capacity” and “the ability to operate and manage [assets] 
themselves”). 
 8. See, e.g., SHI & YU, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing the use of trusts for protecting property 
from adult children who might “squander” it); WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 120-21 (summarizing 
spendthrift and other restrictive trust provisions that prevent a beneficiary from “squandering trust 
benefits”). 
 9. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 3 (citing the example of a dying father who wants to ensure that 
after his death the poorer child will end up with two-thirds of his assets and the wealthier child will 
receive one-third of his assets and explaining that trusts, unlike intestate succession and wills, allow 
assets to be “divided up according to set guidelines” at a later time). 
 10. See, e.g., SHI & YU, supra note 7, at 1-2 (discussing the use of trusts to pay income to one 
family member for her lifetime and then to other family members for their lifetimes); Zhang, supra 
note 3 (stating that the wealthy “through testamentary trusts, can hand their assets down through the 
generations”). 
 11. See, e.g., Gebhardt & Hanisch, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that supporters of the draft Trust 
Law emphasized that trusts might encourage China’s “newly rich . . . to donate considerable sums for 
charitable endeavors”). 
 12. Zhang, supra note 3. The author does not indicate the original source. Most likely, that 
source is Austin W. Scott. 1 AUSTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §1 (William F. Fratcher & Mark 
L. Ascher eds., 4th ed. 2000) (“The purposes for which trusts are created are as unlimited as the 
imagination of lawyers.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article presents the dark side of trusts.13 It points to the very real 
challenges that trusts may pose to China’s distinctive inheritance system. 
Experience in our own country reveals that the world of trusts includes 
murderous beneficiaries,14 thieving trustees,15 and despicable settlors.16 
Settlors use trusts to leave their nearest and dearest destitute,17 to defraud 
their spouses of marital property rights,18 to control their survivors’ 
behavior from beyond the grave,19 and to evade taxes,20 creditors,21 and 
 
 
 13. 1 SCOTT, supra note 12, § 1 (referring to the “darker side of the picture” in discussing uses of 
trusts). 
 14. See, e.g., Hulett v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 956 P.2d 879 (Okla. 1998) (considering 
rights to a testamentary trust where a beneficiary murdered his mother, the trust settlor). 
 15. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 876 P.2d 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a trustee 
engaged in “theft”). 
 16. The offshore asset protection trust appears to be a particularly favored device of such settlors. 
See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving a “telemarketing 
duo” who transferred profits gained from a fraudulent Ponzi scheme into a Cook Islands trust); Debra 
Baker, Island Castaway, 84 A.B.A. J. 54 (Oct. 1998) (discussing the use of offshore asset protection 
trusts to defraud spouses of marital property rights). Several U.S. jurisdictions also now allow 
perpetual asset protection trusts. See LAWRENCE W.WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 879-80 (3d ed. 2002) (describing 
asset protection trust legislation in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and Rhode Island). For extended 
discussion of asset protection trusts, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 32-
38 (1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1035 (2000). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 397 So.2d 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (involving an 
attempted conveyance of homestead property into a revocable inter vivos trust to circumvent a minor 
child’s rights to homestead protection). See also Friedberg v. Sunbank/Miami, N.A., 648 So.2d 204, 
206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (denying a surviving spouse’s and a child’s claims to assets in a 
revocable inter vivos trust). The court stated: 
[W]e are troubled by this result. This case involves a long term, intact marriage. We find it strange 
that a divorced spouse is entitled . . . to reach assets in a revocable, inter vivos trust but a loving, 
devoted spouse is not . . . [T]he amicus brief stated that a citizen has “a constitutional right to be a 
mean-spirited . . . curmudgeon” and that there are “no statutory impediments to developing an 
estate plan that cuts out the spouse.” 
Id. (citations omitted). To make matters worse, conventional protections for children unintentionally 
omitted by will may not apply to trusts. See Robbins v. Johnson, 780 A.2d 1282, 1284 (N.H. 2001) 
(holding that the pretermitted child statute does not apply to trusts). 
 18. See, e.g., Dunnewind v. Cook, 697 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (involving a trust 
created for the “‘sole purpose of . . . prevent[ing] Husband from effectively exercising his statutory 
right as a subsequent surviving spouse to the [decedent’s] assets’”) (citing trial court findings). 
 19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Romero, 847 P.2d 319, 320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (concerning a 
testamentary trust provision leaving use of the testator’s residence to his fiancée “so long as she 
remains unmarried and does not cohabit with an unrelated adult male” and to his minor sons 
“‘provided their mother does not reside there also’”). See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous 
Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273. 
 20. See, e.g., Muhich v. Comm’r, 238 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2001) (involving a “sham trust” for 
tax purposes); United States v. Estabrook, 78 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560-61 (D. Tex. 1999) (setting aside the 
taxpayers’ revocable trust as a fraudulent transfer). 
 21. See, e.g., Cohen v. Comm’r of Div. of Med. Assistance, 668 N.E.2d 769, 778 (Mass. 1996) 
(involving a self-settled trust the court characterized as “the pure case of a trust with no other purpose 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/6
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family support obligations.22 Chinese inheritance practice suggests that a 
similar cast of characters may soon emerge in the Chinese trust context as 
well.23 
As I have discussed elsewhere,24 Chinese inheritance cases demonstrate 
that greed, ingratitude, caprice, and prejudice transcend national and 
cultural boundaries. The difference is that Chinese inheritance law, unlike 
our own, has responded with an array of flexible remedies to punish the 
bad,25 reward the good,26 and protect the needy27 and the caring.28 This 
Article argues that China’s new Trust Law puts these responses at risk. 
Part I identifies the root of the problem. It contends that the Trust Law 
introduces private29 gratuitous trusts that could have a profound impact on 
future disposition of decedents’ wealth in China. Yet, the Trust Law fails 
to provide adequate guidelines regarding the application of inheritance law 
to these trusts. Parts II and III show that this failure threatens to undermine 
three innovative features of China’s existing inheritance system—the 
special schemes for recognizing behavior, support, and gender equality in 
 
 
than to defeat Medicaid ineligibility standards”). 
 22. See, e.g., L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2000) (holding that assets in a father’s 
inter vivos trust could be reached to satisfy his posthumous support obligation toward his disinherited 
minor child); In re Marriage of Perry, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 446-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
assets a father placed in a living trust were part of his “estate” and could be used to satisfy his child 
support obligation). 
 23. See, e.g., Case No. 9, in YI AN SHUO FA: JICHENG FA [USING CASES TO EXPLAIN LAW: 
INHERITANCE LAW] 18 (Li Qizhi et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter USING CASES] (involving a son who 
hacked his father to death with an axe while his father was asleep because he “harbored hatred in his 
heart” after his father denied his request for 2000 yuan and instead gave him a “stern lecture”); Case 
No. 41, in id. at 75 (concerning a “calculating” testator who disinherited his mentally and physically 
disabled daughter so that she would be supported at state expense rather than out of his estate); 
JICHENG FA ANLI XIANG JIE [DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES] 148 (Cui Qinglan et 
al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES] (involving a testator 
who wrote a will a few months before her death disinheriting her eighty-year-old husband and leaving 
her entire estate to her former husband’s nephew) [hereinafter Li Zhi v. Qian Mao]. 
 24. Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model From China, 1999 WIS. 
L. REV. 1199 [hereinafter Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance]; Frances H. Foster, Towards a 
Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 77 (1998) 
[hereinafter Foster, Behavior-Based Model]. 
 25. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, at 85-102. 
 26. See id. at 102-17. 
 27. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1217-39.  
 28. See id. at 1239-54. This flexible approach is by no means unique to the inheritance context. 
For an insightful analysis of the role of judicial discretion in the Chinese legal system, see Margaret Y. 
K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 581 
(1999). 
 29. This Article deals only with private gratuitous trusts. China’s Trust Law also contains 
provisions on charitable trusts. Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 59-73. See Hutchens, supra note 1, at 20 
(summarizing the Trust Law’s “fascinating chapter” on charitable trusts and concluding that “[d]espite 
the requirements for regulatory approval and supervision, the invitation to establish charitable trusts is 
welcome and could stimulate a new, interesting kind of foreign direct investment in China”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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distribution of estates. Part IV concludes that China must address potential 
abuses of trusts for transmission of private wealth. Otherwise, China risks 
a future trusts and estates system, not unlike our own, that leaves the fate 
of the living to the vagaries of the dead. 
I. A TALE OF TWO TRUSTS: THE UNCERTAIN INTERPLAY OF CHINESE 
TRUST LAW AND INHERITANCE LAW 
Under China’s Trust Law, two basic types of private gratuitous trusts 
may have an impact on distribution of a decedent’s estate—testamentary 
trusts and inter vivos trusts. As this Part will show, the Trust Law fails to 
provide adequate guidance regarding the applicability of inheritance law to 
either type of trust. 
A. Testamentary Trusts 
Testamentary trusts [yizhu xintuo] are trusts created by will.30 The 
Trust Law contains a single, skeletal directive on the applicability of the 
Inheritance Law to such trusts. Article 13 states: “Establishment of a 
testamentary trust shall comply with the Inheritance Law’s provisions on 
wills.”31 This language clearly refers to will execution requirements, such 
as signature, date, testamentary capacity, and attestation.32 It is uncertain, 
however, whether other Inheritance Law regulations and restrictions on 
wills extend to testamentary trusts. Annotated commentary to Article 13 
suggests this broader reading. The authors include Inheritance Law 
provisions on modification and revocation of wills, treatment of multiple 
wills, and special restrictions on testamentary disposition to protect 
surviving family members and dependents.33 The authors do not address 
judicial interpretations of the Inheritance Law, however. For example, the 
Chinese Inheritance Law requires that heirs who commit heinous acts 
against the decedent or another heir forfeit their intestate succession 
rights.34 In practice, courts have interpreted this provision liberally and 
extended it to the wills context as well.35 Does this “unworthy heir” 
 
 
 30. See WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 31 (defining a testamentary trust as a trust the settlor 
“established in his will”). 
 31. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 13. 
 32. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jicheng Fa [Inheritance Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (Apr. 10, 1985), in Fagui Huibian 1 (1985) [hereinafter Inheritance Law]. For will execution 
requirements, see id. arts. 17-18, 22. 
 33. WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 31. 
 34. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7.  
 35. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, at 87-94. It should be noted that Chinese 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/6
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disqualification now apply to all beneficiaries named in a will, including 
those with only a remote remainder interest in a testamentary trust? The 
Chinese Trust Law provides no guidance as to how to approach difficult 
issues of this sort. 
B. Inter Vivos Trusts 
Inter vivos trusts [shengqian xintuo] are trusts created by the settlor 
during her lifetime that may continue after her death.36 Article 15 of the 
Trust Law expressly authorizes such trusts. It provides that unless the 
deceased settlor was the sole beneficiary of the inter vivos trust, “the trust 
shall survive and the trust property shall not become part of the settlor’s 
estate.”37 In China, trust “survival” is potentially limitless. Despite advice 
to the contrary,38 Trust Law drafters opted not to include a Rule Against 
Perpetuities or other restriction on trust duration. 
The Trust Law provides no directive whatsoever regarding the 
application of the Inheritance Law to inter vivos trusts. Yet, if U.S. 
practice is any guide,39 this type of trust is likely to have a greater impact 
 
 
law formally gives courts only limited powers to interpret legislation and “Chinese doctrine firmly 
rejects the doctrine of precedent (pan li), denying any binding force to judicial decisions.” STANLEY B. 
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 282-85 (1999); see Nanping Liu, 
“Legal Precedents” with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme 
People’s Court, 5 J. CHINESE L. 107 (1991) (discussing the Chinese approach to precedent). 
Nonetheless, China may be “in a transition period from complete reliance on statute law to a mixed 
system of statute and case law.” Susan Finder, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic 
of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145, 216 (1993). In recent years, China has increasingly published and 
distributed collections of edited cases with analytical discussion by judges and scholars to provide 
guidance on application of statutory provisions to concrete cases. Foster, Linking Support and 
Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1205-06; Liu, supra, at 118-19. Consistent judicial interpretation of the 
Trust Law may be particularly important. See Hutchens, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasizing that the 
Trust Law provides private causes of action rather than “rely[ing] mainly on administrative 
enforcement” and thus “the use of a trust will be influenced by the degree to which People’s Courts 
can provide predictable outcomes in trust cases”). 
 36. See ZHOU, supra note 3, at 110-15 (discussing inter vivos trusts from a comparative law 
perspective). 
 37. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 15. 
 38. See, e.g., François Barriere, Dui Di Wu Zhang de Pinglun: Xintuo de Biangeng He Zhongzhi 
[Comments on Chapter V: Modification and Termination of Trusts], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING 
PROCESS, supra note 2, at 149, 152-53 (recommending that the Trust Law restrict the maximum 
duration for private trusts and discussing the common law rule against perpetuities and ninety-nine 
year limits in France’s draft trust law). 
 39. See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108-09, 1113-25 (1984) (arguing that “[t]he law of wills and the 
rules of descent no longer govern succession to most of the property of most decedents” and 
discussing the dominant role of revocable inter vivos trusts and other will substitutes in gratuitous 
transfer of assets). Note that the Chinese inter vivos trust does not fit neatly under either a “revocable” 
or “irrevocable” category. The Trust Law permits the settlor to revoke the trust if the settlor is the sole 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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on distribution of decedents’ wealth than its testamentary counterpart. 
Through an inter vivos trust, a settlor can effectively transfer all property 
out of her estate during life and bypass inheritance law restrictions on 
disposition, including protections for her neediest survivors.40 Apparently, 
in China as well as the United States,41 a settlor will be able to do so in 
relative secrecy. Although China, unlike the United States,42 does require 
all trusts to be “in written form,”43 it mandates registration of trust 
property only “to the extent required by relevant laws and administrative 
regulations.”44 China even imposes on the trustee an explicit fiduciary duty 
of confidentiality.45 Article 33 of the Trust Law requires the trustee “to 
maintain the confidentiality of the settlor, the beneficiary, and the 
particulars of and documentation connected with [the trustee’s] 
management of trust affairs.”46 Thus, the depletion of the settlor’s estate 
may come as a nasty posthumous surprise to her survivors.47 
 
 
beneficiary, the beneficiary materially infringes the rights of the settlor, the beneficiary consents, or 
“another circumstance stipulated in the trust instrument arises.” Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 50, 51. 
 40. See infra Part III.A (discussing protections for needy survivors). 
 41. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 390-91 
(6th ed. 2000) (discussing the advantages of revocable inter vivos trusts for “persons desiring 
secrecy”).  
 42. Most American states, for example, allow oral trusts of personal property. WILLIAM M. 
MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 202 (2d ed. 2001) (“In most 
states oral trusts of personal property are valid . . . .”). For an extended comparative discussion and 
rejection of oral trusts for China, see ZHOU, supra note 3, at 110-15, 204-05. 
 43. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 8. But see Gebhardt & Hanisch, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing 
the Supreme People’s Court’s use of a “constructive trust” in an unjust enrichment case). 
 44. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 10. Although this provision is supposed to “protect the rights 
and interests of third parties,” WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 24, a basic problem exists. China did not 
have “explicit regulations” on registration in place at the time of the Trust Law’s enactment. Li Xianpu 
& Li Xianming, Xintuo Pinzhong Kaifa Sheji Ji Xiangguan Falu Wenti [The Development and Design 
of a Variety of Trusts and Related Legal Issues] 5, 14 (Aug. 15, 2002) (unpublished conference paper) 
(on file with author). This reference to laws and regulations that have yet to be issued or are 
“unspecified” is not unique to the registration context. See Hutchens, supra note 1, at 19 (stating that 
“the Trust Law retains some of the maddening vague characteristics of PRC legislation—every list of 
requirements ends with the customary catch-all phrase that amounts to ‘such other things as we think 
of later’” and describing Article 8 requirements for trust establishment to include “a writing that can be 
a trust contract, a will or another document acceptable under (unspecified) laws or regulations”). 
 45. The confidentiality requirement emerged late in the drafting process. See Zhang Xuwu, 
Quanguo Ren Da Falu Weiyuanhui Guanyu “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa (Caoan)” 
Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao [Report on the Results of the Examination of the “(Draft) Trust Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” by the Law Commission of the National People’s Congress] (Apr. 24, 
2001), in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui 
Gongbao, no. 4, 323, 325 (May 15, 2001) (proposing addition of the trustee duty of confidentiality 
language at the request of Standing Committee members, regions, and government departments). For 
discussion of the U.S. “duty of confidentiality,” “an incident of the trustee’s duty of loyalty,” see 
CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR., LORING: A TRUSTEE’S HANDBOOK §§ 5.4.1, 6.2.3 (2002). 
 46. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 33. 
 47. This problem of hidden assets already occurs in China. See Liu Zuo, Issues Concerning the 
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China faces two major questions in the future: (1) how to recapture 
assets of an inter vivos trust for inheritance purposes and (2) to what 
extent existing wills doctrines and rules apply to an inter vivos trust that is 
effectively a “will substitute.”48 These questions have challenged our own 
inheritance system for decades and remain unresolved today.49 As Parts II 
and III will show, the stakes are even higher for China. The answers to 
these questions may well determine the fate of China’s distinctive 
approach to inheritance. 
II. TRUSTS AND THE BEHAVIOR-BASED MODEL OF INHERITANCE 
China has implemented an approach to inheritance that our own 
country is only beginning to explore—a “behavior-based model of 
 
 
Imposition of Inheritance Tax in China, CHINA LAW 78, 80 (Dec. 2000) (“[A]lthough there have 
occurred a large number of people possessing large quantities of personal property, these people and 
their property are largely scattered, and much of the property has been well hidden (particularly 
financial property that is not completely under real names).”). Secrecy of trusts may disserve settlors 
as well as survivors. For example, it may undermine the Chinese Trust Law requirements that a settlor 
have the capacity (legal and mental) to establish a trust and do so free from outside coercion. Trust 
Law, supra note 1, art. 19 (stating that the settlor must have “full civil law capacity”); id. art. 5 
(requiring “voluntariness”). See WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 14, 52-53 (stating that the Trust Law 
requires that “[n]o unit or individual whatsoever should employ improper measures of coercion, 
compulsion, or force” and that every settlor has legal and mental capacity). In the United States, some 
settlors deliberately use revocable inter vivos trusts, however, to avoid mental capacity challenges. See 
Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1094-95 (1980) 
(discussing the use of revocable trusts by testators who want to “achiev[e] certainty of testamentary 
disposition”). As Professor Fellows observes: 
Although expectant heirs may challenge a revocable trust for mental incompetency, fraud, or 
undue influence, potential challengers are much less likely to know that that trust exists than that a 
will exists. The settlor of the trust need not publicly disclose its existence. 
Id. at 1094. 
 48. See Langbein, supra note 39, at 1109 (characterizing revocable trusts as one of the “[f]our 
main will substitutes” and stating that “[w]hen properly created, each is functionally indistinguishable 
from a will–each reserves to the owner complete lifetime dominion, including the power to name and 
to change beneficiaries until death”). For an extended discussion of will substitutes, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 7 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). 
 49. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 7.2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) (text, comments, and notes discussing “applications of will 
doctrines to will substitutes”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) 
(text, comments, and notes analyzing applications of testamentary rules and doctrines to revocable 
inter vivos trusts and conflicting approaches to recapture of assets for spousal and creditor’s rights); 
Grayson M. P. McCouch, Will Substitutes Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 58 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1123 (1993) (discussing the trend in the Uniform Probate Code to integrate laws governing wills 
and will substitutes). See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 & cmt. (2001), 7C U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 2002) 
(extending “rules of construction that apply . . . to the interpretation of and disposition of property by 
will” to revocable and irrevocable trusts “as appropriate” and noting the inconsistent approaches 
legislatures and courts take in various jurisdictions). 
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inheritance.”50 Chinese inheritance law recognizes both misconduct and 
exemplary conduct by the decedent’s survivors. It factors in a broad range 
of misconduct. It excludes altogether claimants who commit the most 
serious crimes against the decedent’s person—murder, abandonment, and 
maltreatment “under serious circumstances.”51 The Chinese son who 
hacked his father to death with an axe,52 the mother who deserted her two 
small children,53 and the son and daughter-in-law who drove an elderly 
woman to suicide by beating, cursing, starving, and refusing her heat and 
medical treatment54 all lost rights to inherit from their victims. Chinese 
inheritance law also bars claimants for offenses that “infringe the 
decedent’s lifetime wishes”55—forging, tampering with, or destroying the 
will under serious circumstances.56 It even disqualifies claimants for 
murdering another heir in a battle over the estate.57 
Chinese inheritance law gives courts flexible remedies to respond to 
lesser as well as severe forms of misconduct toward the decedent.58 In 
cases of neglect or abuse that do not reach the level of “serious 
circumstances” required for forfeiture, Chinese courts can59 and do reduce 
the wrongdoer’s intestate share of the estate. For example, one court 
denied a woman’s claim to inherit her sister’s entire estate as sole intestate 
heir.60 The court ultimately awarded her only miscellaneous household 
furnishings because “she did not visit her older sister for more than a 
decade when old lady Qi was elderly and ill many times.”61 
 
 
 50. See generally Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24. 
 51. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7(1), (3). 
 52. See Case No. 9, supra note 23, at 18. 
 53. See Inheritance Case No. 19, in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANXING FALU PANLI 
FENXI QUANSHU [THE COMPLETE VOLUME OF ANALYSES OF CURRENT LEGAL PRECEDENTS OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 113 (1995) [hereinafter CURRENT LEGAL PRECEDENTS]. 
 54. See Case No. 12, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 22.  
 55. Li Huawu, Dui Shiyong Sangshi Jichengquan de Jidian Renshi [Some Thoughts About the 
Applicability of Forfeiture of Inheritance Rights], FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE], no. 4, 35, 35 (1986). 
 56. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7(4). For an extended discussion of judicial applications 
of Article 7(4), see Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, at 92-94. 
 57. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7(2) (requiring forfeiture of inheritance rights for 
“killing another heir in fighting over the estate”).  
 58. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, at 99-102 (discussing remedies for less 
severe misconduct toward family members). 
 59. See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 13, para. 4 (stating that “when the estate is 
distributed, heirs who had the capacity and resources to provide support and did not fulfill their 
support duties should receive no share or a smaller share”). For an extended discussion of how courts 
have liberally interpreted this provision in practice, see Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, 
at 100-01. 
 60. See DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 119 (reproducing the 
case) [hereinafter Old Lady Qi case]. 
 61. Id. at 120. 
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China’s behavior-based model of inheritance also gives courts broad 
discretion to readjust intestate distribution of estates to recognize 
contributions to the decedent’s welfare by family members,62 relatives by 
marriage,63 and nonrelatives64 alike. In China, unlike other countries 
worldwide, the exemplary neighbor or friend may inherit at the expense of 
those “closest” to the decedent by blood alone.65 
As Section A will show, China’s Trust Law contains limited behavior-
based remedies for the settlor. It fails to address, however, the larger 
question of how claimants’ conduct—bad or good—affects distribution of 
trust assets after the settlor’s death. Sections B and C will demonstrate that 
these gaps threaten to undermine China’s behavior-based model of 
inheritance. 
A. The Trust Law’s Behavior-Based Remedies for the Settlor 
Article 51 of the Trust Law continues in the behavior-based tradition 
by providing the settlor remedies to respond to beneficiary misconduct. 
Article 51(1) stipulates that the settlor may change a beneficiary or even 
revoke the trust if that beneficiary “materially infringes the rights of the 
settlor.”66 Article 51(2) also permits the settlor to change a beneficiary (but 
not revoke the trust) if that beneficiary “materially infringes the rights of 
other co-beneficiaries.”67 Annotated commentary indicates that the 
“infringes the rights” [qin quan] language encompasses a wide variety of 
misconduct—acts that “injured the settlor’s [or co-beneficiaries’] person, 
property, etc.”68 The commentary points out that since the wrongdoer 
could be civilly or even criminally liable for such acts, it would be 
“unfair” to allow him “to continue to enjoy trust benefits that the settlor 
 
 
 62. See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 13, para. 3 (allowing courts to award a larger than 
intestate share to any heir who performed “the main duty of support” or “lived with the decedent”). 
 63. See id. arts. 10, 12 (giving courts discretion to elevate to intestate heir status steprelatives 
who supported the decedent and widowed daughters- or sons-in-law who “fulfilled the main duty of 
support toward the decedent”). 
 64. See id. art. 14 (providing that courts can award an “appropriate” legacy to “a person who is 
not an heir but provided considerable support to the decedent”). 
 65. See Foster, Behavior-Based Model, supra note 24, at 111-12 (discussing cases distributing 
substantial legacies to worthy nonrelatives). For an example of such a case, see Old Lady Qi case, 
supra note 60, at 119 (awarding all but the decedent’s household furnishings to a neighbor who looked 
after the decedent “with meticulous care” for nearly twenty years). 
 66. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 51(1). For a critique of this provision, see Barriere, supra note 
38, at 149-50. 
 67. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 51(2). 
 68. WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 129. 
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created for him.”69 
It should be noted, however, that, like the Inheritance Law’s forfeiture 
provisions, Article 51’s behavior-based remedies are available only in 
cases of the most serious misconduct toward the settlor or co-beneficiaries. 
The Trust Law contains no counterparts to the Inheritance Law’s 
responses to less severe misconduct. Indeed, annotated commentary to 
Article 51(1), (2) makes a point of emphasizing that settlor modification 
and revocation of trusts are available only where the beneficiary’s 
“behavior . . . reach[es] the level of ‘material’”70 infringement of the 
settlor’s or co-beneficiaries’ rights. The commentary suggests some 
flexibility in choice of remedy, however. It states that Article 51 gives the 
settlor discretion to decide which remedy to adopt “based on actual 
conditions.”71 The commentary indicates that the settlor may even have the 
flexibility to reduce the wrongdoer’s benefits rather than eliminate those 
benefits altogether.72 
Although the Trust Law explicitly provides remedies during the 
settlor’s life to penalize beneficiary misconduct, it stipulates no 
corresponding remedies after the settlor’s death. This omission threatens 
to undermine the behavior-based model of inheritance by treating 
misconduct differently for disposition of a decedent’s assets by trust rather 
than intestate succession or will. Under current law, trusts may effectively 
allow the wrongdoer to profit from her wrong. 
B. Promoting Inheritance by the Unworthy 
The Trust Law fails to address even the most heinous crime the 
Inheritance Law penalizes—murder of a benefactor.73 When the settlor 
expires at the hands of the beneficiary, so too do the Trust Law’s remedies 
for beneficiary misconduct. There now exists no settlor to exercise Article 
51 rights to change the beneficiary or revoke the trust. This raises the 
troubling question of whether the slayer retains her trust interest. The 
Trust Law provides no guidance. 
In practice, the answer initially may turn on whether the trust was a 
testamentary trust or an inter vivos trust that survived the settlor’s 
untimely demise. As discussed above,74 Article 13 stipulates that 
 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (stating that this restriction “should be emphasized”). 
 71. Id. at 130. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7(1). 
 74. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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testamentary trusts are governed by the Inheritance Law’s provisions on 
wills. Although the Inheritance Law does not expressly extend its Article 7 
forfeiture provisions to will beneficiaries, the Supreme People’s Court has 
so ruled.75 Thus, a slayer arguably loses benefits in a trust “established” in 
a will. 
The impact of homicide on an inter vivos trust interest may prove even 
more problematic in practice. That has certainly been true in the United 
States, where to this day no consensus exists regarding the applicability of 
so-called “slayers statutes” to inter vivos trusts or other will substitutes.76 
Drafters of the most recent version of the Uniform Probate Code 
ultimately addressed the issue by explicitly including trusts and other will 
substitutes and adding a broad catch-all provision: “A wrongful 
acquisition of property or interest by the killer not covered by this section 
must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit 
from his [or her] wrong.”77 
In China, some precedent exists for extending Inheritance Law 
forfeiture provisions beyond intestate succession and wills. For example, 
one court cited the “spirit” of Article 7 to nullify a woman’s rights to 
inherit her former adoptive father’s entire estate under a valid bequest and 
support agreement.78 The court stressed that Ms. Zhao had not only failed 
to perform “well” her promise to feed and clothe Mr. Xie but also 
“infringed Xie’s personal rights and legal property rights” by “beat[ing] 
and curs[ing] him” and stealing his furniture.79 The court’s focus on 
“infringement of rights” is consistent with current Trust Law requirements 
for settlor remedies to address beneficiary misconduct.80 Thus, using 
similar reasoning, future courts could well decide to extend the Inheritance 
 
 
 75. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jicheng 
Fa” Ruogan Wenti de Yijian [Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Matters Concerning 
the Implementation of the “Inheritance Law of the People’s Republic of China”] art. 12 (Sept. 11, 
1985), in Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao, no. 4, 9 (1985) [hereinafter Inheritance Law Opinion].  
 76. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS  
§ 8.4 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) (text, comments, and notes setting out the “slayer” rule and 
analyzing inconsistent statutory and judicial precedent); MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 42, at 68-
74 (discussing conflicting approaches to barring slayers from taking under intestacy, will, or will 
substitute). 
 77. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(f) (2000), 8 U.L.A. 214 (Supp. 2000). The title of Section 2-
803 reveals its unusually broad sweep: “Effect of Homicide on Intestate Succession, Wills, Trusts, 
Joint Assets, Life Insurance, and Beneficiary Designations.” 
 78. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JICHENG FA QUANSHI [THE ANNOTATED 
INHERITANCE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 188, 189 (Zhou Xianqi ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW] (reproducing case). 
 79. Id. at 189. 
 80. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
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Law’s “most severe legal sanction”81 still further beyond its original 
intestate context to penalize the most “unworthy” trust beneficiaries. 
Even if China resolves the issue of applicability of Article 7 forfeiture 
provisions to testamentary and inter vivos trusts, additional questions 
remain. The peculiar division of property ownership under trusts creates 
new fact patterns that the architects of China’s distinctive approach to 
misconduct could not anticipate. 
For example, if a beneficiary kills the settlor, what is the impact on 
alternate takers? Suppose the settlor creates the very type of trust 
commentators recommend—a trust to protect and transmit family wealth 
through the generations.82 If the settlor is murdered by her only son, the 
initial income beneficiary, are her son’s children disqualified as well for 
the ‘sins of their father’?83 What about unborn descendants? Some 
American courts have in fact adopted such a sweeping rule. They have 
disqualified the slayer and all persons related to the slayer, including 
unborn children, in order to prevent the slayer from receiving “indirect 
benefits.”84 This approach would seem to comport with Chinese intestate 
succession practice as well.85 Chinese courts have even preferred escheat 
of the victim’s estate to the state or a collective organization over 
inheritance by the wrongdoer’s relatives.86 In the trust context, however, 
this “indirect” punishment of the wrongdoer violates the settlor’s express 
wishes. It thus puts the behavior-based model in direct collision with one 
of the principal rationales for trusts—donative freedom.87 Donative 
 
 
 81. Li, supra note 55, at 36. 
 82. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d 195, 198 (N.C. 1985) (allowing a slayer’s 
children to inherit the slayer’s share and stating that “[w]hile it may be true that ‘the gods visit the sins 
of the fathers upon the children,’ Euripides, Phrixus (see also Exodus 20:5; Shakespeare, Merchant of 
Venice III v 1), this Court will not do so”). 
 84. In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 37 (Wis. 1981) (“The rule that persons directly related 
to the murderer are disqualified with him, is premised on the indirect benefits that would thereby flow 
to the murderer himself.”). 
 85. See Inheritance Case No. 19, supra note 53, at 113 (stating that lineal descendants of an heir 
who forfeited inheritance rights under Article 7 do not inherit); Inheritance Case No. 425, in MIN 
SHANG FA XIN LEIXING ANLI JINGXI [ESSENTIAL ANALYSIS OF NEW TYPES OF CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW CASES] 1201 (Liu Zhixin et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter NEW TYPES OF CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW CASES] (stating that children should not inherit Article 7 wrongdoer’s share by 
representation). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme People’s Court exempts two categories 
of lineal descendants from forfeiture of inheritance rights–descendants who “are unable to work and 
have no source of income” and descendants who “performed considerable support duties toward the 
decedent.” Inheritance Law Opinion, supra note 75, art. 28. 
 86. See, e.g., Case No. 10, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 19 (ruling that murderers and their 
heirs lost inheritance rights resulting in escheat of the estate to a collective). 
 87. See Lusina Ho, Xintuo Lifa Bu Yi Cao Zhi Guoji [Trust Legislation Should Not Be Acted 
Upon in Undue Haste], 1 BEIDA FALU PINGLUN [PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW], no. 2, 618, 634 
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freedom may well prevail. 
Trust ownership creates other complexities for China’s behavior-based 
model. Consider, for example, the case of a man who bludgeons his 
brother to death88 (or carves him into eight pieces and buries him under a 
fruit tree89) in a battle over their father’s assets. In the intestate succession 
context, the slayer forfeits his rights to his father’s estate under Article 
7(2) of the Inheritance Law (“killing another heir in fighting over the 
estate”).90 In the trust context, however, the answer is not as obvious. If the 
father/settlor is still alive, he clearly has the right under Article 51(2) of 
the Trust Law to remove the slayer as trust beneficiary.91 Murder of a co-
beneficiary meets even the most stringent definition of a “material” 
infringement of a co-beneficiary’s rights.92 
After the father/settlor’s death, however, it is uncertain whether the 
slayer will pay for his crime with loss of his property rights as well as his 
freedom.93 In the United States, characterization of the slayer’s trust 
interest as “contingent” or “vested” could determine the outcome.94 That 
is, if the slayer would not receive the interest but for the death of the 
victim, he forfeits the interest.95 If the slayer’s crime simply accelerated 
the slayer’s enjoyment of an interest he already possessed, then he does 
 
 
(1998) (stating that “[t]he basic principle of the trust system is that a property owner has the freedom 
to dispose of his own property” and showing that this principle “could potentially conflict with other 
principles”). 
 88. See DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 18, 20 (reporting an 
Article 7 forfeiture case in which one brother “savagely bludgeoned his brother to death” with a 
wooden cudgel). 
 89. See Case No. 10, supra note 86, at 19 (reporting an Article 7 case in which two brothers 
murdered their younger brother, carved him into eight pieces, and buried him in the backyard under a 
fruit tree). 
 90. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 7(2). 
 91. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 51(2). 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 70 (discussing “material” requirement). 
 93. In some of the Chinese inheritance cases, the slayers escaped the death penalty and received 
a sentence of “death with reprieve.” Others were not as fortunate. See, e.g., Case No. 9, supra note 23, 
at 19 (involving a slayer who received “death with reprieve” because he voluntarily surrendered 
himself to the authorities); Case No. 10, supra note 89, at 20 (stating without explanation that one of 
the two brothers who killed their youngest brother received the death sentence and the other received 
death with reprieve). 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. 
n (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) (distinguishing between the situation where an indefeasibly vested 
remainder trust beneficiary kills the life tenant and where a contingent remainder beneficiary kills the 
life tenant); MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 42, at 72-73 (distinguishing between vested remainder 
and contingent remainder cases). 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. 
n illus. 9 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). Another possibility is that “the court could wait to see if B [the 
slayer] outlives A’s [the victim’s] normal life expectancy.” MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 42, at 
73 (citing In re Moses’ Estate, 300 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) as an example). 
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not forfeit the interest.96 If China adopts a similar distinction,97 definitions 
of private property rights could once again trump behavioral 
considerations in disposition of decedents’ wealth. 
C. Ignoring the Claims of the Worthy 
Chinese inheritance law explicitly rewards exemplary conduct toward 
the decedent, regardless of whether the estate is distributed by intestacy, 
will, or contract. Trusts promise to frustrate these innovative schemes for 
recognizing survivors’ “acts of care.”98 
1. Circumventing Intestate Remedies 
China’s Inheritance Law gives courts broad discretion to readjust 
intestate distribution of estates to reflect claimants’ actual contributions to 
the decedent’s financial, physical, and emotional welfare during life as 
well as funeral arrangements after the decedent’s death.99 This scheme 
encompasses all of the decedent’s meritorious survivors, irrespective of 
their family status. Thus, in marked contrast to the situation in the United 
States,100 a model Chinese son who stayed at home to care for his elderly, 
ill father could receive five times more than his brothers who were too 
“busy at work” to visit or even write letters to their father.101 A widowed 
daughter-in-law who “willingly bore [the] burden” of looking after a man 
so grief-stricken at his son’s death that he became ill and bedridden for a 
decade could be elevated to intestate heir status.102 Even a neighbor could 
 
 
 96. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 42, at 72-73 (“If B’s [the slayer’s] remainder was 
vested he ought not to forfeit it . . . ”). The slayer’s “enrichment from accelerating his remainder could 
be avoided by postponing his enjoyment for the duration of [the victim’s] normal life expectancy,” 
however. Id. at 72; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) § 8.4 cmt. n illus. 8 (stating that the slayer “receives the remaining 
corpus, which is the present value of the remainder interest determined actuarially”). 
 97. The Chinese Trust Law provides only a broad definition of beneficiary as “a person entitled 
to enjoy the benefits of a trust.” Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 43, para. 1. It fails to deal with such basic 
issues as income versus remainder interests and the rights of unborn beneficiaries, let alone vested 
versus contingent interests. See WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 112-14, 116-17 (discussing these 
gaps). 
 98. I borrow this term from Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as 
the Foundation of Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 514 (1996) (stating that the “current law of 
undue influence . . . does not adequately account for acts of care”). 
 99. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1241-45 (discussing and 
citing cases). 
 100. See id. at 1239-40, 1244-45 (contrasting American and Chinese approaches). 
 101. Case No. 30, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 55, 55-56. 
 102. See FAXUE ANLI JINGXUAN [SELECTED LAW CASES] 84, 84 (Li Liangpin et al. eds., 1994) 
[hereinafter SELECTED LAW CASES] (reproducing case). 
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end up with the bulk of a decedent’s estate to recognize her two decades of 
“meticulous care.”103 
Trusts present both indirect and direct threats to China’s innovative 
remedies. First, trusts can circumvent the basic prerequisite for the 
Inheritance Law’s flexible readjustment scheme—an intestate estate for 
courts to distribute. If a settlor transfers property during life into an inter 
vivos trust, she depletes or even eliminates that estate.104 Thus, unless 
China adopts future measures to locate and recapture trust assets after the 
settlor’s death, courts may be effectively precluded from recognizing 
survivors’ acts of care toward an intestate decedent. 
Second, trusts promise to expand a significant current exception to the 
behavior-based distribution of estates. In practice, courts have decided that 
freedom of testation supersedes intestate reward schemes.105 As a result, if 
a decedent leaves a valid will that expresses his genuine wishes—no 
matter how misguided or capricious—that will preempts courts from 
rearranging his estate plan to reflect his survivors’ good deeds. One case 
analysis summed up this restriction: “It should be made clear that even if 
an heir performed duties toward the decedent, the decedent can, 
nonetheless, make a will leaving his or her estate to another person. To be 
effective, the will need only conform with the requirements stipulated in 
the Inheritance Law.”106 
Under this exception to the behavior-based model of inheritance, a 
mother could disinherit her younger son who helped defray her living 
expenses for nearly twenty years, simply because on a given day she “felt 
her elder son was very kind to her.”107 Similarly, a father could disregard 
the twelve years of extraordinary support his sons provided to their father, 
stepmother, and half-siblings and leave them nothing but his advice to 
“live independently, relying on their own labor, and become good children 
of China.”108 
 
 
 103. Old Lady Qi case, supra note 60, at 119. 
 104. See supra Part I.B. 
 105. At least one case commentary has rejected this view, however. See MIN SHANG FA SHIWU 
YANJIU: JICHENG JUAN [A STUDY OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE: INHERITANCE 
VOLUME] 50 (Yang Zhenshan ed., 1993) [hereinafter CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE] 
(stating that it is “impermissible” to use wills to disinherit “people who performed the main duties of 
support, especially . . . female heirs who performed the main duties of support”). The Inheritance Law 
expressly gives wills precedence over intestate succession. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 5. 
 106. See Case No. 85, in ZHONGGUO MINFA JIAOXUE ANLI XUANBIAN [COLLECTION OF CHINESE 
CIVIL LAW CASES FOR TEACHING] 201, 201 (1996) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF CASES FOR 
TEACHING]. 
 107. Case No. 33, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 61, 61-62. 
 108. Case No. 85, supra note 106, at 201, 201. 
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Chinese commentators have defended such outcomes on the grounds that 
application of intestate remedies would be “inappropriate” and would “blu[r] 
the distinction between intestate succession and testate succession.”109 This 
rationale would seem to extend also to disposition of assets by a valid 
testamentary trust. Annotated commentary to the Inheritance Law articulates 
a broader principle that could encompass inter vivos trusts as well: “The 
testator has the right to transfer his own property to whomever he wishes. As 
long as he does not violate legal prohibitions, others cannot interfere.”110 
2. Restricting Enforcement of Will Provisions for Worthy Survivors 
In China, will dispositions in favor of caregivers—family and 
nonfamily alike—are considered “both legal and appropriate.”111 Courts 
apply will execution requirements liberally to enforce informal, 
unconventional, and defective wills that recognize beneficiaries’ 
contributions to the testator’s welfare. They uphold unwitnessed, 
handwritten wills (holographic wills),112 audiotaped wills,113 oral wills,114 
and proxy wills115 that reward support of the decedent. One Shanghai court 
even allowed a will despite “defects” in its “witnessing document.”116 The 
 
 
 109. Id. at 202. 
 110. ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 76 (defending the testator’s right to devise 
his estate to his son and omit his daughter). 
 111. DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 154. 
 112. See, e.g., Case No. 37, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 68, 69 (upholding a will that 
disinherited the testator’s granddaughter for “unfilial” behavior, left six gold rings to her “neighbor 
who looked after [her] during illness,” and devised the remainder of her estate to the “Municipal 
Children’s Welfare Foundation to educate those who do not understand respect for the elderly, do not 
cherish the elderly, and have regard only for money”). See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 17, 
para. 2 (allowing holographic wills that are “in the testator’s handwriting, signed, and dated”). 
 113. See, e.g., Case No. 38, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 70, 74 (upholding an audiotaped 
will devising the estate to the decedent’s grandchild who supported her). See Inheritance Law, supra 
note 32, art. 17, para. 4 (allowing audiorecorded wills that have at least two witnesses). 
 114. See, e.g., Inheritance Case No. 15, in ANLI XUANBIAN [COLLECTION OF CASES] 141, 142 
(1986) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF CASES] (upholding an oral will in favor of a neighbor who 
supported the decedent). See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 17, para. 5 (allowing oral wills 
“under emergency circumstances” if witnessed by at least two witnesses). 
 115. See, e.g., CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 105, at 103 [hereinafter Yu 
Lai v. Yu Jing & Chen Xia] (enforcing a proxy will devising the decedent’s entire estate to the two 
individuals who cared for the testator during illness). Wu Yuzhi dictated the will to her danwei leader. 
Id. He wrote and signed the will, which she and two witnesses then signed. Id. The court declared the 
will valid but required allocation of a mandatory share from the estate to Wu’s minor son. Id. at 104. 
For a discussion of mandatory share protections, see infra Part III.A. See Inheritance Law, supra note 
32, art. 17, para. 3 (allowing wills written by a witness on a testator’s behalf so long as that witness 
writes, dates, and signs the will and the testator and at least one other witness sign the will). 
 116. Case No. 1, in ’95 SHANGHAI FAYUAN ZUI XIN ANLI JINGXUAN [’95 SELECTION OF THE 
SHANGHAI COURTS’ LATEST CASES] 1, 2 (Li Guoguang et al. eds., 1995). 
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court emphasized that the beneficiaries had been the testator’s principal 
caregivers during his final bout with lung cancer and had arranged and 
paid for his funeral.117 
China’s Trust Law could undermine this liberal enforcement of will 
dispositions for a decedent’s most worthy survivors. The new legislation 
requires that all trusts, including testamentary trusts, be “in written 
form.”118 Unlike oral wills (and contracts119), oral trusts are void. Chinese 
scholars and drafters attribute this difference to the “continuous nature” of 
trust management or disposition of property and the complexity it creates 
in relations among trust parties.120 They also point to the particular 
problems of supervising and enforcing trusts in China.121 They claim 
written trusts “protect trust parties’ legal rights and interests” and “prevent 
disputes.”122 
Although these arguments for excluding oral trusts are well-founded, 
exclusion may lead to some peculiar results in practice. In effect, form 
rather than substance determines whether the testator/settlor is able to 
reward exemplary conduct. For example, suppose a testator makes a valid 
oral will in favor of two neighbors who tended to her every need during 
life. If she leaves an outright legacy to one neighbor but puts money in 
trust for the other neighbor, apparently only the first neighbor would take. 
China also faces the problem of defining what constitutes “written 
form.” Annotated commentary indicates that testamentary trusts in 
holographic or proxy wills will meet the writing requirement.123 It does not 
mention trusts in audiotaped wills, however. Yet, audiotaped wills, like 
oral wills, are expressly permitted by the Inheritance Law.124 The status of 
trusts in videotaped, faxed, or electronic format is equally uncertain. 
Article 11 of China’s Contract Law defines “written form” broadly to 
“refe[r] to written contract, letter, electronic text (including telegraph, 
wire, facsimile, electronic data exchange, or electronic mail), and any 
 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 8. 
 119. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
art. 10 (Mar. 22, 1999), in Fagui Huibian, vol. 1, 4, 6 (1999) [hereinafter Contract Law] (permitting 
oral contracts except in limited cases). See also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General 
Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] art. 56 (Apr. 12, 1986), in Fagui Huibian 1, 
13 (1986) (allowing civil juristic acts in oral as well as written or other form). 
 120. WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 19. 
 121. Id.; ZHOU, supra note 3, at 110-15, 204-05. 
 122. WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 19. 
 123. Id. at 31. 
 124. See supra notes 113-14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p151 Foster book pages.doc  3/10/2003   6:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
170 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2:151 
 
 
 
 
other means that conveys the contents in visible form.”125 Given the 
different treatment of oral trusts and oral contracts, however, it is unclear 
to what extent courts will apply this expansive contractual definition of 
“written form” in the trust context. 
3. Conflicts with Contractual Disposition of Estates 
Chinese inheritance law actively promotes126 the use of so-called 
“bequest and support agreements,” under which one party promises to 
leave all or part of his estate to another party in exchange for “lifetime 
support and burial after death.”127 As in the wills context, courts enforce 
these agreements liberally in practice to reward exemplary conduct toward 
the decedent. If the supporting party entered into the arrangement in good 
faith and “scrupulously observe[d]”128 its terms, courts make every effort 
to recognize that party’s contributions to the decedent’s welfare even 
where the agreement is informal, oral, defective, or prematurely 
terminated by the other party.129 
Under Chinese inheritance law, these contractual arrangements for 
disposition of a decedent’s wealth have the highest legal status.130 They 
override intestacy rules131 and conflicting will provisions.132 As a result, 
bequest and support agreements with a distant relative or nonrelated 
individual or organization—be it a nephew,133 village collective,134 or the 
 
 
 125. Contract Law, supra note 119, art. 11. 
 126. See Inheritance Case No. 428, in NEW TYPES OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW CASES, supra 
note 85, at 1211, 1213 (stating that the bequest and support agreement “should be vigorously 
developed and promoted” because it “lightens the burden on society . . . [and] can also encourage the 
younger generation to support the elderly and nurture the disabled and minors”). 
 127. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, arts. 31, 32. 
 128. ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 189 (stating in an appellate opinion that 
“the supporting party also should scrupulously observe the agreement and perform support duties”). 
 129. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1252-53 (discussing liberal 
enforcement of bequest and support agreements). 
 130. See Case No. 57, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 104 (case commentary stating that “[t]he 
bequest and support agreement has the highest legal force of the five methods for transferring 
estates”). 
 131. See Inheritance Case No. 428, supra note 126, at 1213 (asserting that bequest and support 
agreements have a higher legal status than intestate succession). 
 132. See Inheritance Law Opinion, supra note 75, art. 5 (stating that if the decedent’s bequest and 
support agreement and will “are in conflict, [the estate] is disposed of in accordance with the 
agreement, and the will that conflicts with the agreement is entirely or partially void”). 
 133. See Case No. 88, in COLLECTION OF CASES FOR TEACHING, supra note 106, at 209 
(enforcing an elderly widow’s bequest and support agreement with two nephews and denying her 
daughter’s intestate succession claim). 
 134. See, e.g., Case No. 57, supra note 130, at 103 (enforcing a bequest and support agreement 
with a village collective organization and rejecting the decedent’s daughter’s intestacy claim). 
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Wooden Junk Transport Cooperative135—have trumped inheritance claims 
by even the decedent’s children. 
Trusts promise to create significant conflicts with these contractual 
approaches for rewarding the decedent’s worthy survivors. The basic 
problem is that Chinese law has yet to specify where trusts rank in the 
hierarchy of schemes for disposing of a decedent’s assets. This omission 
may well raise numerous questions in practice. 
For example, suppose a settlor enters into a bequest and support 
agreement under which she promises to devise one-half of her estate to the 
supporting party. Two years later, she creates a trust that effectively 
transfers all her assets to a trustee to manage on behalf of someone other 
than the supporting party. If the supporting party fulfills his obligation to 
provide lifetime care, who takes the decedent’s assets after her death? 
If the trust is a testamentary trust, the court may decide to extend the 
Supreme People’s Court’s directive for resolving conflicts between wills 
and bequest and support agreements. That directive states that where the 
documents “are in conflict, [the estate] is disposed of in accordance with 
the agreement, and the will that conflicts with the agreement is entirely or 
partially void.”136 
If the trust is an inter vivos trust, however, challenging questions arise. 
First, are assets in an inter vivos trust part of the decedent’s “estate” for 
purposes of a bequest and support agreement? As discussed above, the 
Trust Law explicitly excludes such assets from the settlor’s estate except 
where the settlor is the sole beneficiary.137 Second, can a supporting party 
under a bequest and support agreement reach trust assets as a “creditor”138 
of the settlor? Third, if a supporting party does qualify as a creditor, what 
is the likely impact on the trust? Can the trust be “nullified” under Article 
12 as a trust “establish[ed]” by the settlor that “prejudices the interests of 
her creditors”?139 Or does the trust remain valid with respect to the one-
half of the settlor’s assets that is not distributed pursuant to the bequest 
and support agreement? Note that even if the trust is “nullified,” the 
 
 
 135. See CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 105, at 177, 178 (ruling that the 
decedent’s bequest and support agreement with the Wooden Junk Transport Cooperative supersedes 
the decedent’s will devising her entire estate to her daughter). 
 136. Inheritance Law Opinion, supra note 75, art. 5. 
 137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The general rule is that once the agreement 
becomes effective, the supported party “has no rights to distribute his estate in another way [or] to give 
it to a third party.” Liu Nanzheng & Zhang Peilin, Yizeng Fuyang Xieyi Chu Tan [Preliminary 
Exploration of Bequest and Support Agreements], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 3, 6, 8 
(1985). 
 138. See Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 17, para. 1. 
 139. Id. art. 12, para. 1. 
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supporting party may not be adequately rewarded for his acts of care. The 
Trust Law stipulates that “nullification shall not affect the trust benefits 
already obtained by a bona fide beneficiary.”140 
Suppose, instead, the settlor creates the trust prior to entering into the 
bequest and support agreement. If the trust is a testamentary trust, the date 
the settlor made the trust is irrelevant. Under Chinese law, the trust does 
not become effective until after the settlor’s death.141 If the trust is an inter 
vivos trust, however, the timing becomes important. An inter vivos trust 
can be valid prior to the bequest and support agreement and legally 
dispose of all of the supported party’s assets.142 This situation reveals 
further gaps in the Trust Law that threaten to undermine the bequest and 
support agreement courts and scholars argue “deserves the utmost 
encouragement.”143 The key question the Trust Law leaves unanswered is 
whether a supporting party has any claim whatsoever to assets transferred 
into a valid inter vivos trust that predates a bequest and support agreement. 
If not, how does someone entering into such an agreement discover 
whether the other party in fact has property to devise at death?144 
Unfortunately, the Trust Law is silent on this issue as well. Although 
Chinese law provides expansive information rights to settlors and 
beneficiaries,145 it has yet to resolve the information issues that will 
confront outsiders dealing with trust parties.146 
* * * 
 
 
 140. Id. art. 12, para. 2. 
 141. The trust must also be accepted by the trustee. Id. art. 8, para. 3. See WANG & GUO, supra 
note 6, at 31 (stating that “[a] testamentary trust refers to a trust that the settlor during his lifetime 
established in his will and after his death became effective”). 
 142. An inter vivos trust becomes effective during the settlor’s lifetime and may survive the 
settlor’s death. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 143. Case No. 57, supra note 130, at 104 (case commentary stating that the bequest and support 
agreement “deserves the utmost encouragement”). 
 144. This need for information about assets held in trust could arise in another context as well–
where the supporting party enters into a bequest and support agreement with someone who turns out to 
be the beneficiary of a spendthrift or other protective trust that restricts transfer of the beneficiary’s 
trust interest and creditors’ rights to reach the trust interest. See Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 47, 48 
(providing that if restrictive provisions exist in the trust document, trust benefits cannot be used to 
discharge an insolvent beneficiary’s debt or transferred). 
 145. See id. art. 20 (providing information rights for the settlor); id. art. 49 (extending Article 20 
rights to the beneficiary). See WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 53-55 (discussing information rights). 
 146. See Li & Li, supra note 44, at 5 (discussing the dangers for third parties dealing with trusts 
due to the lack of a system for public recording of trusts). 
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An early commentator on China’s 1985 Inheritance Law expressed 
concern about the possible dangers of exalting freedom of testation.147 He 
pointed out that “wills frequently reflect the testator’s goodness or evil, 
joy or disgust at a given moment” and can create serious unfairness and 
conflict.148 He took comfort, however, in the fact that the “overwhelming 
majority of inheritance [cases] are handled on the basis of intestate 
succession” and that “very few cases” involve disposition of assets by 
will.149 The author cautioned that intestacy must retain its dominant 
position or else “harmful” results would ensue.150 By adding trusts to its 
scheme for donative transfer of wealth, China may have opened the door 
to still further inequity and erosion of its distinctive behavior-based system 
of inheritance. As Part III will show, trusts could also undermine the 
inheritance system’s mechanisms to promote support and gender equality. 
III. TRUSTS, SUPPORT, AND GENDER EQUALITY 
The architects of China’s Inheritance Law sought to use inheritance to 
accomplish two ambitious, “distinctively Chinese” goals: (1) to encourage 
private support of dependents and (2) to improve the status of women in 
Chinese society.151 Trusts could frustrate both goals. 
A. Challenges to Support Protections 
China explicitly links support and inheritance.152 It uses inheritance to 
reward those who provide support and to protect those who need 
support.153 As Part II.C. has shown, trusts challenge existing mechanisms 
for recognizing survivors of the first support relationship—the exemplary 
claimants who contributed to the decedent’s welfare.154 This Part will 
argue that trusts present threats as well to schemes that respond to 
survivors of the second relationship—the needy survivors whom the 
decedent supported (or should have supported) during life. 
Chinese intestacy rules give courts broad discretion to readjust intestate 
 
 
 147. See Zhang Peilin, Tantan Jicheng Fangshi [Discussing Inheritance Methods], FAXUE 
[JURISPRUDENCE], no. 3, 26, 26-27 (1986). 
 148. Id. at 26-27. 
 149. Id. at 27. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Law on Inheritance Pushes Equal Rights, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 16, 1985, at 1 (legislators 
emphasizing that support and gender equality were goals of the draft Inheritance Law). 
 152. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1217-54. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See supra Part II.C. 
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shares to reflect need as well as desert.155 Courts can and do provide larger 
than intestate shares to heirs who are “unable to work” and “whose lives 
are especially difficult.”156 Courts have awarded most or even all of the 
estate to a ten-year-old schoolgirl,157 a mentally ill son,158 and an elderly, 
disabled widow.159 Chinese intestacy law also ensures that dependents 
outside the immediate family circle do not have their lives unduly 
disrupted by the decedent’s death.160 In China, a needy sister,161 an “old 
and weak”162 grandmother, and even a destitute old man in the countryside 
to whom the decedent had voluntarily contributed ten yuan per month163 
all could inherit. 
As discussed above,164 trusts threaten intestate schemes by restricting 
or even eliminating the estate that courts have available to distribute to 
needy survivors. China has responded to this problem in the wills context 
by creating a limitation on donative freedom. It requires that wills reserve 
“mandatory shares” for “heirs who are unable to work and have no source 
of income”165 and for children born after the decedent’s death.166 China’s 
Supreme People’s Court has directed that any will that does not reserve 
such shares is partially void and can dispose of only the property that 
remains after satisfying the shares.167 In practice, courts have applied 
mandatory share provisions to rescue a wide variety of disinherited family 
members, including a severely disabled daughter,168 a minor son,169 a 
 
 
 155. See Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance, supra note 24, at 1230-39. 
 156. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 13, para. 2. 
 157. See ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 94-95 (reporting case). The court also 
used Article 13 to award larger than intestate shares to the decedent’s elderly and ill parents. Id. at 95. 
 158. See, e.g., Case No. 28, in USING CASES, supra note 23, at 52, 53. 
 159. See, e.g., DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 105, 106-07 
[hereinafter Yu Hu v. Wang Chunlan] (awarding the bulk of the decedent’s estate under Article 13, 
paragraph 2 to the decedent’s widow who was elderly, infirm, unable to work, and destitute). 
 160. See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, arts. 10, 12, 14 (providing remedies for blended and 
extended family members and nonrelatives). 
 161. See DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 116, 116 
(reproducing a case in which a court ruled that the decedent’s elderly, ill, and destitute sister was 
entitled to an “appropriate” share of the estate). 
 162. Id. at 115, 115 (reproducing Old Lady Li case). 
 163. Yu Hu v. Wang Chunlan, supra note 159, at 105-07. 
 164. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 165. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 19. 
 166. Id. art. 28. 
 167. Inheritance Law Opinion, supra note 75, art. 37. 
 168. See CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 105, at 140, 141 [hereinafter Wang 
Jianshu v. Liu Zhen] (holding a will partially void because it did not reserve a mandatory share for the 
decedent’s disabled daughter); Case No. 41, supra note 23, at 75, 76 (declaring a will void that 
disinherited the decedent’s mentally and physically disabled daughter). 
 169. Yu Lai v. Yu Jing & Chen Xia, supra note 115, at 105. 
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ninety-one-year-old mother,170 and a surviving spouse so destitute she was 
forced to sell her deceased husband’s old fur-lined jacket to survive.171 
Dependents disinherited by trust rather than will may suffer a very 
different fate. In a surprising gap, China’s new Trust Law does not 
expressly extend mandatory share protections to trusts. At best, it does so 
indirectly and to testamentary trusts only. As discussed above,172 Article 
13’s stipulation that “establishment” of testamentary trusts must comply 
with the Inheritance Law’s “provisions on wills” may or may not 
encompass the Inheritance Law’s mandatory share as well as will 
execution requirements. 
If mandatory share protections are applied to testamentary trusts, 
significant questions remain. Professor Lusina Ho raised one such 
question in her 1998 critique of the draft Trust Law—whether such trusts 
are “completely or partially void.”173 She noted that in the wills context 
courts must resolve this issue on a case-by-case basis.174 Thus, she warned 
that “trusts that might not satisfy Article 19 of the ‘Inheritance Law’ [the 
mandatory share provision] could potentially go through lengthy litigation 
before their status is determined.”175 
Property questions arise as well. For example, suppose the decedent 
leaves property in trust for a minor or mentally disabled family member. 
Will property in trust be seen as the equivalent of outright ownership for 
mandatory share purposes? What if the individual entitled to a mandatory 
share is only one of several trust beneficiaries? Chinese inheritance 
practice indicates that mandatory share property can be managed by a third 
party as agent for the dependent survivor.176 Moreover, one commentator 
has stated that “the decedent has complete freedom to specify which 
property should be reserved for heirs.”177 
Another property issue concerns contributions to the mandatory share. 
If a testamentary trust is included in a will that devises other property 
outright to legatees, it is unclear which assets are used to satisfy the 
mandatory share. Potentially, the share could come from the trust first, 
from the legatees first, or from the trust and legatees on a pro rata basis. 
Finally, the enforcement of mandatory share rights against 
 
 
 170. Case No. 1, supra note 116, at 3. 
 171. Inheritance Case No. 20, in COLLECTION OF CASES, supra note 114, at 146, 146-47. 
 172. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
 173. Ho, supra note 87, at 634. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Wang Jianshu v. Liu Zhen, supra note 168, at 141. 
 177. Id. at 142 (case analysis). 
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testamentary trusts is uncertain. If a trust is involved, does a claimant have 
to bring formal action under the Trust Law as a “creditor”?178 Or will 
courts continue to address mandatory share issues on a case-by-case basis 
in disputes regarding distribution of decedents’ estates? 
As for dependents omitted by inter vivos trusts, their fate is even more 
precarious. Although commentators in the inheritance context have 
indicated that limits on freedom of testation, including mandatory share 
requirements, may also apply to donative transfers other than wills,179 the 
final version of the Trust Law did not adopt that position. Yet, only a year 
earlier, a high-level symposium of Chinese and foreign trust experts had 
specifically highlighted the dangers inter vivos trusts could pose to 
mandatory inheritance rules.180 The experts recommended adding a new 
provision to the Trust Law that would have given qualifying survivors 
creditors’ rights “if the settlor died within a certain period after 
establishing the trust.”181 They argued that this amendment would “ensure 
that [survivors] have the right to challenge the trust and protect their 
inheritance rights.”182 Perhaps the Chinese courts ultimately will expand 
the Trust Law’s definition of “creditor” in this way to respond to the plight 
of the settlor’s neediest survivors. 
B. Threats to Gender Equality 
In 1985, Chinese legislators proclaimed that a fundamental objective of 
the new inheritance legislation was “to insure equality between the 
sexes.”183 Since that time, inheritance has emerged as an important tool not 
only to recognize women’s legal property rights but also to combat 
“feudal, patriarchal”184 notions of the status of women in the Chinese 
 
 
 178. Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 12, 17. 
 179. See, e.g., Case No. 41, supra note 23, at 76 (commentary on a mandatory share case stating 
that the Inheritance Law’s “limits on freedom of testation” do not apply only to “testate succession”). 
 180. Summary Report, supra note 2, at 172. Interestingly, unlike the English translation, which 
used the term “mandatory inheritance regulations,” id. at 511, the Chinese text of the report referred 
broadly to rules relating to intestate heirs that “must not be circumvented.” Id. at 172. Thus, its 
recommended remedy for decedents’ survivors might encompass cases where inter vivos trusts 
depleted intestate estates that would otherwise be distributed to worthy or needy heirs. See supra Parts 
I.B, II.C.1 & text accompanying note 164. 
 181. Summary Report, supra note 2, at 172. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Law on Inheritance Pushes Equal Rights, supra note 151, at 1. See also Guanyu “Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Jicheng Fa (Cao An)” de Shuoming [Explanation of the “(Draft) Inheritance Law 
of the People’s Republic of China”], RENMIN RIBAO, Apr. 14, 1985, at 4, 4 (speech by Wang Hanbin 
discussing the draft Inheritance Law’s efforts “to protect women’s inheritance rights”). 
 184. Inheritance Case No. 10, in COLLECTION OF CASES, supra note 114, at 137, 137 (case 
analysis describing “adoption” of a relative’s son to ensure a male inherits as “a pure and simple evil 
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family, economy, and society. In inheritance law and practice, China has 
sought to promote gender equality through two principal mechanisms: 
intestate succession and marital property schemes. Gaps in the Chinese 
Trust Law could put both mechanisms in jeopardy. 
1. Defeating Intestate Approaches for Promoting Gender Equality 
In an early analysis of the new law, Zhou Xianqi remarked that “from 
beginning to end, the Inheritance Law is permeated with the principle of 
gender equality.”185 Nowhere is that commitment to gender equality more 
evident than in the law’s intestate succession chapter. The chapter opens: 
“Men and women have equal inheritance rights.”186 
Post-1985 inheritance cases reveal that gender discrimination remains a 
serious problem in China. Fathers try to cut out daughters by “adopting” a 
relative’s son to inherit the family business.187 Brothers insist their married 
sisters are “spilled water,”188 “outsiders”189 with no rights to family 
 
 
legacy of the feudal, patriarchal clan system”). 
 185. Zhou Xianqi, Shi Lun Wo Guo Jicheng Fa de Xingzhi he Tedian [Preliminary Discussion of 
the Nature and Special Characteristics of Chinese Inheritance Law], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN 
LAW], no. 5, 32, 34 (1985). 
 186. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 9. Subsequent articles explicitly make male and female 
family members of the same relationship to the decedent equally eligible to inherit, id. art. 10 (granting 
equal status to sons and daughters, fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, grandfathers and 
grandmothers), and give special recognition to support contributions by widowed daughters- and sons-
in-law. Id. art. 12. Other intestate provisions use gender-neutral terms. See, e.g., id. art. 11 (giving 
“lineal descendants” rights to inherit shares of deceased parents by representation); id. art. 13 
(readjusting intestate shares to reflect support needs or contributions of an “heir”); id. art. 14 (stating 
that a “person” who was in a support relationship with the decedent can receive an “appropriate” 
amount from the estate). 
 187. See, e.g., Inheritance Case No. 10, supra note 184 (denying the inheritance rights of a 
nephew “adopted” by the decedent to inherit the family business at the expense of the decedent’s 
daughter). See JICHENG FA LIJIE SHIYONG YU ANLI PINGXI [UNDERSTANDING APPLICATIONS OF 
INHERITANCE LAW AND CASE ANALYSES] 57-58 (Gao Yan & Liu Yuling eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING APPLICATIONS] (discussing the Chinese traditional practice of adopting a relative’s 
son for inheritance purposes). 
 188. See, e.g., Tradition in the Shadow of Modern Legal Practice: Continuity and Change in the 
Delivery of Justice in China (I), 31 CHINESE L. & GOV’T 74 (Sept.-Oct. 1998) (Ethan Michelson ed. & 
trans.) (reproducing a May 18, 1995 letter to a Chinese newspaper legal advice column by a daughter 
whose brothers claimed that “girls who marry are spilled water, so the estates of parents can only be 
divided by sons, and there is no share for daughters”). 
 189. Inheritance Case No. 3, in COLLECTION OF CASES, supra note 114, at 130, 131 (involving a 
son who claimed “if there is a male, the estate goes to the male, if there is no male, it goes to the 
female” and “a daughter who marries becomes an outsider”). In another case, a son argued 
unsuccessfully that his married sister had no inheritance rights because his parents had given her 
money when she married. Case No. 1, in UNDERSTANDING APPLICATIONS, supra note 187, at 177, 
178. 
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property.190 In-laws likewise argue that their sons’ widows forfeit 
inheritance rights upon remarriage.191 One son even disputed his elderly 
mother’s claim to family property on grounds that she stayed at home and 
“never worked.”192 
In each situation, Chinese courts and commentators have used intestacy 
as a legal and didactic mechanism to address gender discrimination and 
the mindset that perpetuates it.193 They have emphasized that intestacy 
rules governing both entitlement to inherit and special recognition of 
support needs and contributions apply across the board to all Chinese 
citizens.194 
Under China’s new Trust Law, can the father “imbued with the feudal 
ideology that men are superior to women”195 now do by trust what he 
cannot do by intestate succession—transfer all assets to his son and ignore 
even his most devoted daughter? Or is a trust of this sort void on legal or 
public policy grounds? The Trust Law does not directly address this 
question.196 Precedent in the wills context suggests that discriminatory 
trusts may well be upheld. Despite early views that discriminatory wills 
 
 
 190. It should be noted that although most of the disputes involve married daughters, occasionally 
siblings argue that a married son who lives with his wife’s family has no inheritance rights. See, e.g., 
Case No. 77, in COLLECTION OF CASES FOR TEACHING, supra note 106, at 180 (three brothers 
claiming that their brother who had lived with his wife’s family for more than a decade “should not 
receive a share of [their parents’] estate” because “[t]his was the same as a daughter marrying out of 
the family”). 
 191. See, e.g., ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 94-95 (reporting a case in which 
parents-in-law claimed unsuccessfully that because their son’s widow remarried she could not inherit 
her deceased husband’s estate). 
 192. Yu Hu v. Wang Chunlan, supra note 159, at 106. 
 193. See, e.g., Case No. 1, supra note 189, at 177-83 (case and analytical commentary discussing 
gender discrimination in inheritance); CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 105, at 41-
46 (same). 
 194. See Zhang Yongen, Yi Bu Juyou Zhongguo Tese de Jicheng Fa [An Inheritance Law with 
Chinese Characteristics], 25 FAXUE JIKAN [LEGAL STUDIES QUARTERLY], no. 3, 33, 35 (1985) 
(discussing the full range of Inheritance Law provisions “recognizing and protecting women’s equal 
rights of inheritance” and promoting “the constitutionally prescribed principle of gender equality”). In 
several cases, courts apply both entitlement and support provisions in distributing intestate estates. See, 
e.g., Yu Hu v. Wang Chunlan, supra note 159, at 105 (recognizing an elderly, infirm widow’s 
entitlement to marital property and first order intestate heir status and also factoring in her special 
support needs). 
 195. Inheritance Case No. 19, in COLLECTION OF CASES, supra note 114, at 145, 145-46 (referring 
to a father who disinherited his minor daughter by will). 
 196. The Trust Law requires a “lawful trust purpose,” Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 6, and contains 
a general statement that when trust parties “engage in trust activities, they must comply with laws and 
administrative regulations, respect the principles of voluntariness, fairness, and good faith, and not 
infringe the interests of the state or society.” Id. art. 5. The Trust Law provides that a trust is void if 
“[t]he trust’s purpose violates laws or administrative regulations or harms the public interest.” Id. art. 
11(1). It does not specify whether a trust that discriminates on the basis of gender falls within these 
provisions. 
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violate law and “socialist morality,”197 the general consensus today is that 
donative freedom prevails even at the expense of gender equality.198 The 
daughter disinherited by will thus has no rights to her father’s estate unless 
she is sufficiently young, disabled, or destitute to qualify for mandatory 
share protection.199 The daughter disinherited by trust, however, may not 
have even that protection.200 
Because China has not adopted a Rule Against Perpetuities or any 
limitation on trust duration,201 trusts present even greater challenges than 
wills to gender equality. For example, suppose the settlor restricted trust 
beneficiaries to male descendants with male children. In so doing, the 
settlor could exercise the ultimate “dead hand”202 control from beyond the 
grave and create a financial incentive for generations of family members 
to have male rather than female children. This condition would not only 
conflict with intestacy’s gender-neutral rules.203 It would also fly in the 
face of China’s “one child per family” population planning policy and 
 
 
 197. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 147, at 26-27 (stating that a will that disinherits a daughter who 
supported the testator and leaves the entire estate to a son who provided little or no support violates 
law and socialist morality). See also CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE, supra note 105, at 50 
(stating that it is “impermissible” to use wills to disinherit “people who performed the main duties of 
support, especially . . . female heirs who performed the main duties of support”). 
 198. See ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 76: 
It should be emphasized that when handling inheritance issues the principle that men and women 
have equal inheritance rights is a principle only for intestate succession. One cannot use this 
principle for handling testate succession. When a testator by will devises his estate to his son and 
does not devise his estate to his daughter, this cannot be said to infringe the principle that men and 
women have equal inheritance rights. Moreover, it does not invalidate the will. The testator has 
the right to transfer his property to whomever he wishes. 
 199. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (discussing the mandatory share). 
 200. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the Trust Law to address 
the applicability of mandatory share protection to trusts). 
 201. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. For analyses of possible approaches other than the 
Rule Against Perpetuities to “curtai[l] . . . dead hand control of wealth,” see DUKEMINIER & 
JOHANSON, supra note 41, at 854-56 (discussing Canadian and English reforms and possible 
variations); Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 
66 N.C. L. REV. 545 (1988) (proposing a statutory rule to terminate trusts after 125 years). 
 202. For extended discussion of the notion of “dead hand” control, see generally LEWIS M. SIMES, 
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of 
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985); Adam J. Hirsch & William K. S. 
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992). Perpetual trusts promote 
maximum dead hand control. For example, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) has calculated that an average settlor who created a trust for her descendants 
would have 3.4 million living beneficiaries 500 years after creation of the trust. Verner F. Chaffin, 
Georgia’s Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much Control, 35 GA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000) 
(citing NCCUSL Jan. 2000 press release). Nonetheless, because of the recent trend to restrict or even 
repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities, perpetual trusts increasingly “exist unmolested and 
undenounced” in the United States. Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the 
RAP Has No Friends–An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 601 (2000). 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
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efforts to persuade citizens that daughters and sons are equally valuable.204 
It would continue to do so as long as trust assets remained. Or, suppose the 
settlor created a trust that included his surviving spouse and female 
descendants as beneficiaries but only so long as they remain unmarried. If 
valid, this trust would effectively defeat rules requiring intestate 
distribution of wealth to female claimants regardless of marital status.205 
U.S.206 and Chinese207 experience suggests that such trust provisions 
are by no means obscure hypotheticals. China faces difficult questions 
ahead in deciding where to strike the balance between donative freedom 
and gender equality. 
2. The Uncertain Impact of the Trust Law on Marital Property Rights 
Schemes 
The skeletal Trust Law also raises troubling questions for China’s 
second inheritance mechanism for promoting gender equality—marital 
property rights. Under the Chinese Inheritance Law, the surviving 
spouse—husband or wife—is entitled to one-half of all “jointly-owned 
 
 
 204. See Tyrene White, Domination, Resistance and Accommodation in China’s One-Child 
Campaign, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 102, 111 (Elizabeth J. Perry & 
Mark Selden eds., 2000) (discussing an “education campaign” aimed at “repudiating the feudal idea 
that males . . . were superior to females . . . and insisting on the equal value of a boy or girl”). China 
initiated its “one-child” policy over twenty years ago. For extended discussion of this policy, see 
CHINA’S ONE-CHILD FAMILY POLICY (Elisabeth Croll et al. eds., 1985); PENNY KANE, THE SECOND 
BILLION: POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING IN CHINA (1987). After lengthy delay, China’s 
legislature finally enacted the first national Law on Population and Family Planning on December 29, 
2001. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renkou yu Jihua Shengyu Fa [Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Population and Family Planning] (Dec. 29, 2001), in Guowuyuan Gongbao, no. 4, 5 (2002). 
Abuses of the one-child policy, such as female infanticide, infant abandonment, and sex-selective 
abortion through use of ultrasound technology, have contributed to a skewed “ratio of 117 boys born to 
every 100 girls, much higher than the international average of 106:100.” China Passes Law on 
Population Control and Family Planning, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 29, 2001, in LEXIS, Asiapc 
Library, Curnws File; see Li Yongping & Peng Xizhe, Age and Sex Structures, in THE CHANGING 
POPULATION OF CHINA 64, 68-74 (Peng Xizhe & Guo Zhigang eds., 2000) (discussing skewed sex 
ratio and possible causes); White, supra, at 112-14 (same). 
 205. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. 
 206. See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 42, at 165-67 (discussing conditions relating to 
marriage and divorce in U.S. wills and trusts). Note that a provision “so long as she remains 
unmarried” may be valid if “‘the dominant motive of the transferor is to provide support until 
marriage’ rather than to induce the transferee to remain unmarried.” Id. at 165 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (1981)). For an extended discussion of 
conditions on trust beneficial interests, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. d-h & rptr. 
notes (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999). 
 207. See UNDERSTANDING APPLICATIONS, supra note 187, at 75, 86 (discussing will provisions 
stating that a “wife cannot inherit if she remarries” and leaving the testator’s estate to whichever son or 
sons “produce male children”). The authors concluded that both will conditions would be void. Id. 
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property acquired during a marriage of continuous duration.”208 In 
practice, courts have interpreted this language expansively to give the 
survivor rights to a wide range of assets spouses acquired either 
individually or jointly during marriage.209 Indeed, in marked contrast to 
U.S. community property schemes,210 Chinese courts have treated property 
a spouse received during marriage by gift or inheritance as marital 
property rather than separate property.211 One court even extended the 
definition of jointly-owned marital property to a premarital asset to give an 
elderly widow rights to the two-room house she had shared with her 
husband for twenty years.212 
Trusts present new fact patterns that challenge existing marital property 
schemes. Consider, for example, the situation where a husband unilaterally 
creates a trust for someone other than his spouse out of income he earned 
during marriage. Under marital property rules, that income is jointly 
owned by both spouses, not individually owned by the settlor. Thus, the 
initial question is whether the trust is valid. The settlor has effectively 
 
 
 208. Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 26. This provision applies unless the parties have made 
another arrangement for disposition of marital property. Id. 
 209. See, e.g., Case No. 430, in NEW TYPES OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW CASES, supra note 
85, at 1216, 1218 (awarding a surviving spouse marital property rights in a store, house, telephone 
installed in the decedent’s brother’s house paid for by the decedent, motorcycle, cash account “under 
contract,” television, washing machine and other electrical appliances). 
 210. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 41, at 473 (“Property acquired before marriage 
and property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent is the acquiring spouse’s separate 
property.”). 
 211. Case No. 430, supra note 209, at 1219 (case analysis stating that joint marital property 
includes “property acquired after marriage by one or both spouses in the form of a gift, legacy, or 
inheritance”). See also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu Renmin Shenli Lihun Anjian Chuli Caichan 
Fenge Wenti de Ruogan Juti Yijian” [Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court “On Certain Concrete 
Issues that Confront People’s Courts in Division of Property in Divorce Cases”] art. 2(2) (Nov. 3, 
1993) [hereinafter 1993 Opinion], in ANNOTATED INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 78, at 166 (defining 
joint marital property for divorce purposes to include property received by inheritance or gift by one or 
both spouses). Future courts may not adopt this approach for distribution of marital property, however. 
See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text (discussing new definitions of marital property under 
the Chinese Marriage Law Amendments and the Supreme People’s Court interpretation). 
 212. DETAILED EXPLANATION OF INHERITANCE CASES, supra note 23, at 121, 121-22 
(reproducing the case). Although the decedent had purchased the house before marriage, it became 
joint marital property. The court explained that “any property acquired by a spouse before marriage is 
considered joint marital property if both parties did not agree otherwise after marriage and if they were 
married for a relatively long time (generally over 15 years).” Id. Another court used the same approach 
to give an eighty-year-old man rights to the house he had shared with his wife for over twenty years. 
Li Zhi v. Qian Mao, supra note 23, at 148-49. A few months prior to her death the wife had written a 
holographic will leaving her house and all other property from before her marriage to her former 
husband’s nephew. Id. at 149. The court characterized the house as marital property, citing “the 
Supreme People’s Court’s ‘Opinion on Certain Matters Concerning Implementation of the Principles 
of the Civil Law’ provision that whenever there has been a lengthy marriage, property that has been 
used, managed, and administered by both parties together for a long time can be regarded as joint 
marital property.” Id. 
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disposed of property that belongs to another person as well as himself. The 
Trust Law provides no clear answers. It simply states that the settlor must 
“lawfully own” trust property or have “lawful rights in property.”213 The 
Trust Law is equally unclear as to the impact on the trust. It provides that a 
trust that fails to meet trust property requirements is “void.”214 It does not 
specify whether a trust that contains marital property is entirely void or 
partially void. 
In the case of a testamentary trust, Article 13 and annotated 
commentary suggest application of conventional rules for wills that 
dispose of marital property.215 That is, the court will first allot to the 
surviving spouse one-half of the marital assets transferred into the trust 
and then distribute the remainder to the trust.216 This extension of wills 
rules to testamentary trusts appears reasonable where the settlor 
transferred the bulk of his marital property into the trust. What if, instead, 
the trust assets represent only a small portion of the joint marital property 
in the decedent’s estate? If there exist sufficient other assets to satisfy the 
survivor’s marital property rights, must the court still allocate one-half of 
the trust assets to the survivor?217 Or can the court leave the trust 
untouched and award the surviving spouse one-half of the aggregate value 
of all marital property in the decedent’s estate? Neither the Chinese Trust 
Law nor previous inheritance cases provides a definitive answer.218 
Spousal rights to marital property in an inter vivos trust are even less 
secure. The surviving spouse will confront the initial hurdle of locating 
assets transferred into an inter vivos trust.219 Even if she succeeds in doing 
so, her status and remedies under the Trust Law are uncertain. Is she a 
“creditor”220 for Trust Law purposes? If so, is she entitled to void the trust 
entirely or does she have a claim only to her one-half marital property 
interest? Does the timing of her action make a difference? In some U.S. 
 
 
 213. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 7. 
 214. Id. art. 11(3). 
 215. See supra Part I.A (discussing Article 13 and the uncertain application of will requirements 
to testamentary trusts). Annotated commentary to Article 13 states that the Inheritance Law’s marital 
property rights provision applies to testamentary trusts. WANG & GUO, supra note 6, at 31. 
 216. See Inheritance Law, supra note 32, art. 26 (providing that one-half of the joint marital 
property is first allotted to the surviving spouse and the remainder constitutes the decedent’s estate). 
 217. Under the so-called “item theory,” applied in most U.S. community property states, “husband 
and wife own equal shares in each item of community property. They do not own equal undivided 
shares in the aggregate of community property.” DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 41, at 523. 
 218. Compare Case No. 430, supra note 209, at 1218 (using an aggregate value approach) with 
SELECTED LAW CASES, supra note 102, at 66 (allotting one-half of the decedent’s bank savings and 
other property to the decedent’s surviving spouse). 
 219. See supra Part I.B. 
 220. Trust Law, supra note 1, arts. 12, 17(1). 
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jurisdictions, if the spouse brings action during the settlor’s lifetime she 
can set aside the entire trust (or other gift to a third party) and “reclaim the 
property for the community.”221 If she brings action after the settlor’s 
death, however, she is only “entitled to set aside the gift to the extent of 
one-half.”222 
Transfer of marital property into trust is just one issue the Trust Law 
fails to address. Another is the status of the new property interests it 
creates.223 For example, the Trust Law does not consider possible marital 
property claims to property one spouse manages as trustee for a third 
party.224 It should be noted, however, that although the Trust Law does not 
specifically deal with the marital property context, it does state generally 
that trust property is not “part of the trustee’s own property . . . or the 
trustee’s estate”225 and is not subject to claims of the trustee’s individual 
creditors.226 Thus, a trustee’s spouse likely also has no rights to trust 
property.227 
Even more challenging classification questions arise in the case of a 
married beneficiary of a trust.228 The Trust Law does not indicate whether 
the beneficiary’s equitable interest in the trust constitutes marital or 
 
 
 221. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 41, at 523 (referring to California’s approach to gifts 
of community property to a third party). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Several commentators have emphasized that trusts introduce a system of property rights that 
conflicts with Chinese definitions. See, e.g., Richard Qiang Guo, A Look at China’s New Trust Law, 
CHINA ONLINE, (Aug. 17, 2001) (contrasting the “Anglo-American . . . notion of ‘fiduciary 
ownership,’ a peculiar judicial institution in which the trustee becomes legal owner, and the 
settlor/beneficiary remains as an owner or equity . . . [with] the Chinese legal system, rooted in civil 
law tradition, [which] inherits Roman law rule dictating ‘one thing, one owner’”), at 
http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/legal/NewsArchive/cs-protected/2001/August/c01081658.asp; Ho, 
supra note 87, at 634 (stating that “because the trust system is essentially a system of dual property 
rights and our system follows [the principle of] ‘one thing, one owner’ and because there is no system 
for ownership of property for another person, this produces numerous technical questions”). For an 
extended discussion of trust property issues, see Li Qunxing, Lun Xintuo Caichan [On Trust Property], 
FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL STUDIES COMMENTARY], no. 1, 77 (2000). 
 224. See Ho, supra note 87, at 634 (raising the issue of whether the Marriage Law’s provision on 
jointly-owned marital property “include[s] property that one spouse owns as trustee”). Professor Ho 
points out that under the Marriage Law, “[u]nless both parties have agreed otherwise, spouses have 
equal rights to manage jointly-owned property.” Id. It is unclear whether the Chinese trustee even has 
“ownership” rights to the trust property. See Guo, supra note 223 (“As a matter of legislative history, 
according to Professor Jiang Ping, senior member of the drafting committee of the Trust Law, the 
legislators deliberately avoided stipulating that the ownership or property rights of the trust property 
belong to trustee.”). 
 225. Trust Law, supra note 1, art. 16. 
 226. Id. art. 18. See also id. art. 37 (providing that the trustee is personally liable for any debts 
incurred as the result of “breaching his management duties or improperly handling trust affairs”). 
 227. This is the “general rule” in the United States. ROUNDS, supra note 45, at 396. 
 228. See Ho, supra note 87, at 634 (asking whether a trust beneficiary/“spouses’s rights and 
interests [are] categorized as jointly-owned marital property”). 
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separate property. Equally uncertain is the classification of income or 
other property actually distributed to the married beneficiary. Chinese 
inheritance precedent suggests that marital property schemes may 
encompass these new property interests.229 Moreover, a 1993 Supreme 
People’s Court opinion230 provides further support for inclusion of trust 
interests. The Court stated in the divorce context that “jointly owned 
marital property” comprehends property one spouse received by 
inheritance, gift, as well as “other legally acquired” property.231 Recent 
amendments to China’s Marriage Law, however, complicate matters 
considerably.232 New Article 18 of the Marriage Law explicitly redefines 
the scope of marital property to exclude “property identified in a will or 
gift as belonging to the husband or wife alone” and “[o]ther property that 
should be considered the property of one party alone.”233 In December 
2001, China’s Supreme People’s Court confirmed this narrower definition 
of marital property for Marriage Law purposes.234 The impact on China’s 
trust system remains an open question. If U.S. experience is any 
precedent,235 China faces major challenges in integrating its trust and 
marital property systems. Yet, the outcome may be crucial to the success 
of China’s larger objective of promoting gender equality through 
inheritance. 
 
 
 229. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. 
 230. 1993 Opinion, supra note 211. 
 231. Id. at art. 2(2), (6). 
 232. See Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changweihui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Hunyin Fa” de Jueding [The Decision of the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee on Amending the “Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China”] (Apr. 28, 2001), in 
Guowuyuan Gongbao, no. 21, 8 (2001). For a superb summary and analysis of the debates that led to 
revision of the Chinese Marriage Law, see William P. Alford & Shen Yuanyuan, Have You Eaten? 
Have You Divorced? Debating the Meaning of Freedom in China, in REALMS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
MODERN CHINESE WORLD (William C. Kirby ed., forthcoming 2002). 
 233. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa [Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
art. 18 (as amended Apr. 28, 2001), in Guowuyuan Gongbao, no. 21, 11 (2001). 
 234. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hunyin Fa” 
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court of Certain Matters Concerning 
Application of the “Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China”] art. 19 (Dec. 27, 2001), in 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao, no. 1, 16, 17 (2002) (stating that property owned individually by 
one spouse only will not become joint marital property because of the existence and continuation of 
the marriage unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties). 
 235. See GEORGE C. BOGERT ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 110 n.5 (7th ed. 
2001) (“The various jurisdictions still lack uniformity with respect to marital laws which determine the 
relative interests of the trust beneficiary and his spouse.”); David William Gruning, Comment, 
Reception of the Trust in Louisiana: The Case of Reynolds v. Reynolds, 57 TUL. L. REV. 89, 89, 121 
(1982) (discussing a “problem created by the trust in [Louisiana]: the characterization of the interest of 
a trust beneficiary who is also a spouse living under the legal matrimonial property regime of the 
community of acquets and gains” and concluding that the trust can create “uncertainty” and “untoward 
results in cases involving traditional civilian concepts such as donation and community property”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In her 1998 analysis of the draft Trust Law, Professor Lusina Ho 
identified significant conflicts with existing Chinese legal concepts and 
rules.236 She cautioned legislators not to move with “undue haste”237 in 
adopting China’s first Trust Law. Unfortunately, as this Article has shown, 
Chinese legislators did not heed her warning. They enacted a Trust Law so 
riddled with gaps and ambiguities that it threatens to undermine China’s 
innovative inheritance system.  
This Article has demonstrated that trusts challenge all three distinctive 
features of Chinese inheritance law: China’s behavior-based distribution 
of estates,238 recognition of support needs and contributions,239 and efforts 
to promote gender equality through inheritance.240 As Parts II and III have 
shown,241 the current Trust Law effectively turns inheritance law on its 
head.242 The Trust Law allows decedents to reward the bad,243 punish the 
good,244 leave the needy unprotected,245 and exclude the survivor based on 
gender alone.246 
The Trust Law’s impact on the inheritance system will not be felt 
immediately. In today’s China, private trusts are “almost nonexistent.”247 
 
 
 236. Ho, supra note 87, at 630-35. 
 237. Id. at 618. 
 238. See supra Part II. 
 239. See supra Part III.A. 
 240. See supra Part III.B. 
 241. See supra Parts II, III. 
 242. Trust Law drafters did not deliberately set out to change the face of Chinese inheritance law. 
They did so by accident more than design. Until the very end, drafters focused on the needs of China’s 
commercial trust industry and thus failed to anticipate the full implications of their law for private 
gratuitous transmission of wealth. See supra note 3 (discussing the original emphasis of the drafters). 
As Professor Walter Hutchens has noted, “[a]s late as June 2000, drafts of the Trust Law included 
provisions on trust companies. However, in its final form, the Trust Law is not about trust companies.” 
Hutchens, supra note 1, at 18. Immanuel Gebhardt and Holger Hanisch have argued that the use of 
trusts for private management and inheritance of wealth emerged as “important” only late in the 
drafting process when supporters of the draft law needed a new rationale for adopting the law. See 
Gebhardt & Hanisch, supra note 3, at 5. The draft Trust Law had been effectively shelved since the 
1998 collapse of China’s second largest trust company, Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Corporation, and the ensuing “rectification and liquidation” of Chinese trust and investment 
companies. See Wang Lianzhou, Xintuo Fa Chu Tai, Buyi Zai Tuo [The Trust Law Should Not Be 
Delayed Any Longer], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 2, at 14, 17-18 
(discussing the drafting process). 
 243. See supra Part II.B. 
 244. See supra Part II.C. 
 245. See supra Part III.A. 
 246. See supra Part III.B. 
 247. Luo Ying, Xintuo Ye de Jichu [The Basis of the Trust Industry], ZIBEN SHICHANG ZAZHI 
[CAPITAL MARKETS MAGAZINE], no. 1, 22, 23 (2002). 
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Reports suggest, however, that this situation may not continue for long. 
Indeed, a recent Chinese commentator described the “potentially 
enormous market” for such trusts and advocated “major efforts to exploit 
it.”248 Thus, China may soon discover for itself the full panoply of services 
trusts provide—both “for good or for bad.”249 
If China’s citizens do in fact embrace trusts,250 the future of its 
distinctive inheritance system is precarious. Without significant 
improvements in existing trust legislation251 and appropriate 
enforcement,252 China’s unique schemes for addressing survivors’ 
individual needs and circumstances are unlikely to withstand the 
challenges trusts present. In the end, an inheritance law for the living 
could give way to a trust law for the dead.253 
 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 5, 1996) (“The 
history of the trust reveals the role it has played, for good or for bad, in avoiding some of the undesired 
consequences of legal ownership.”). 
 250. See Gebhardt & Hanisch, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that it is “very difficult to predict 
whether the Chinese people will use trusts for managing private property or for making wills that are 
not currently permitted under Chinese law”). 
 251. For example, Chinese lawmakers need to clarify the impact on trusts of the Inheritance Law’s 
provisions on forfeiture, mandatory share, and marital rights. See supra Parts II.B, III.A, III.B. They 
also should consider possible schemes for identifying and recapturing inter vivos trust assets for 
inheritance purposes. See supra Parts I.B, II.C.1, III.A, III.B.1. In addition, they should revisit the 
decision to permit perpetual trusts. See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 201. Chinese authorities 
will also need to address taxation of trusts. See Hutchens, supra note 1, at 21 (observing that because 
the “Trust Law is almost silent concerning the taxation of trusts, and the PRC has no special 
regulations to date on the taxation of trusts . . . [c]larification of tax issues is needed”). 
 252. As Jamie Horsley has recently underscored, “even the best laws are of little use if they are 
not enforced consistently and fairly.” Jamie P. Horsley, Book Review, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform 
in China After Mao, 29 CHINA BUS. REV. 51, 51 (May-June 2002). 
 253. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, 
Succession, and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 340 (referring to succession law as “[t]he [l]aw of the 
[l]iving, the [l]aw of the [d]ead”). 
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